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Editorial 
Questions of context in studies of talk and interaction — 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
 
 
1. Context 
The questions dealt with in this special issue of Journal of Pragmatics are doubly 
vexed. The first matter at issue is that the papers I’ve solicited take on some 
aspects of the debate within, and between, ethnomethodology (EM) and 
conversation analysis (CA) — and, by extension, wider approaches to discourse 
analysis and perhaps even pragmatics as a whole — as to whether and, if so to 
what extent, contextual particulars are relevant to the analyst’s task in hand; 
therefore specifying, to some degree, what that task actually is. 
  This context debate is, within CA and related disciplines, almost legendary 
by now and can range from positions where one must scrutinise the 
conversational text and nothing but the text, via intermediate positions that allow 
certain restricted aspects of context to appear in the analysis. Then we move up to 
(or down to, depending on your analytic viewpoint) allowing in such matters as 
the broad social, cultural and political milieux in which everyday interactions 
happen to happen. 
  Most of this debate is referenced in an earlier paper with Mark Rapley and 
Charles Antaki, published in Journal of Pragmatics (McHoul et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, I won’t rehearse it here. With due modesty, I believe the article 
exhibits some pertinent elements of how those who may disagree (sometimes 
profoundly) on questions of context in EM/CA can still agree to write together 
and open up the issue for further discussion. At least, it was the acceptance of this 
paper by Journal of Pragmatics that prompted the further discussion that is this 
special issue as such. Some readers may then want to turn to that paper at this 
point, as an extended preface to this current issue. It can be found at: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2007.03.006>. Should any reader not be 
able to access the full paper, its abstract gives some of its flavour: 
To deal with some current debates about the analytic validity of ‘contextual’ 
details in the analysis of talk-in-interaction, we (Alec McHoul and Mark Rapley) 
work through two cases. The first is hypothetical and derives from the current Intro: 2 
 
literature in speech-act-theory-inspired pragmatics (Capone, 2005). The second is 
actual and arises from our initial disagreement with an earlier publication by one 
of our colleagues (Charles Antaki [1998]). What we hope to show is that the idea 
of context is, itself, something of a moveable feast; that it can have multiple 
formations ranging from the broadly political to the almost-but-not-quite effect of 
surface texts and their sequential implications. In this respect, we hope to ease 
tensions between otherwise cognate approaches to the analysis of talk-in-
interaction. Our argument is that, if context is hearable in the talk as such, then it 
cannot be ignored by analysts. In the third section of the paper (and precisely so 
as not to make this a ‘contestation’), Charles responds in his own terms and to see 
what kind of mutual footing there may (or may not) be for all involved in the 
analysis of talk vis-à-vis questions of context. If there is an upshot of the paper as 
a whole it is that further work on the ‘context question’ in studies of talk-in-
interaction could well entail a return to (and perhaps a respecification of) the 
foundational ethnomethodological question of the status of ‘members’ 
knowledge’. 
 
2. Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
The second controversial matter is not so much explicitly mentioned as implicit in 
the project as a whole and embedded in its title: namely the assumption that there 
has always been and remains a clear relationship between CA and its parent 
enterprise, ethnomethodology. For some working in these fields today, the 
disciplines (or sub-disciplines) are quite distinct. Indeed, there is a whole 
generation of conversation analysts who have learned their trade with no working 
knowledge of EM; and, perhaps more sadly, who have been actively discouraged 
by their mentors from delving into ethnomethodological questions. There are 
perhaps fewer, as it were, ‘pure’ ethnomethodologists who never consider 
conversational materials as relevant to their endeavours. 
  Under very different mentors — particularly David Hatch, Rod Watson, 
Wes Sharrock and John Lee — and in a very different era, I never questioned an 
obvious connection between EM and CA. And I still do not resile from that stance 
which comes, for the greater part, from studying the published and unpublished 
works of Harvey Sacks. Sacks, to be sure, founded CA; but he was absolutely 
explicit that conversational materials were simply one form (and by no means the Intro: 3 
 
only possible form) of access to how the everyday order of things is constituted. 
Conversational ‘data’ were, for Sacks, no more than easily obtainable bits of the 
social world that were both ready to hand, anywhere one looked or listened, and 
easily preservable (as recordings and transcripts) for detailed analytic inspection. 
Other materials of a similar nature were and are just as ready to hand and 
preservable, as Eric Livingston’s paper in this issue shows. For EM purposes, 
conversational materials need not be any more or less useful than, to mention 
Eric’s interests here, those derivable from completing jigsaw puzzles, making 
mud maps, playing draughts (checkers) or solving problems in geometry. 
  The field of ‘talk and interaction’ is, accordingly, a massively diverse one 
and by no means confined to activities of conversing.1 Here, we may take our cue, 
when thinking of it as a whole — if that is even possible — of Wittgenstein’s 
notion of ‘language-games’ in the Investigations (1958:¶23): 
  Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that 
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 
  Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in 
others: 
  Giving orders, and obeying them— 
  Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements— 
  Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
  Reporting an event— 
  Speculating about an event— 
  Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
  Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams— 
  Making up a story; and reading it— 
  Play-acting— 
  Singing catches— 
  Guessing riddles— 
                                                 
1 The and is italicised to distinguish it from the more restrictive in. In addition, I would 
want to argue for the term talk itself to be expanded — at least for analytic purposes — 
beyond its usual and blinkered quasi-synonymy with conversation. Talk can be just as 
synonymous with, say, mean/refer to in ordinary English; as in, ‘we’re talking millions 
here’; and there are many and varied other alternatives for talk. Etymologically, it derives 
from the Middle English talken, the frequentative of tell. Talk is broad enough to cover 
pretty much whatever is telling. Again, for analytic purposes, then, ‘talk and interaction’ 
may be a half-decent draft specification of what pragmatics as such analyses. Intro: 4 
 
  Making a joke; telling it— 
  Solving a problem in practical arithmetic— 
  Translating from one language to another— 
  Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 
 
Two things are manifest, at least to me, from this possible parallel between 
something like our ‘talk and interaction’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘language-games’. (1) 
What we’re ultimately interested in is taking pretty much any bit of ordinary 
everyday interaction as a means of understanding forms of life (Lebensformen) as 
such and not simply for its own sake as a technical object. Without this injunction, 
claims to social scientific status are null and void. (2) As a consequence of (1), 
conversation may be our favourite ‘game’ (mine happen to be cryptic crosswords 
and the Italian card game scopa) but it’s not the only one in town. 
  Conversing, then, is just one of the indefinitely many things we happen to 
do routinely and which can, on analysis, reveal the mundane condition (for Sacks, 
‘the cultural machinery’) of the social order itself. And this is EM’s unique 
contribution to the social sciences: an alternative specification of those sciences’ 
foundational question — how is the social order possible? The assumption 
(hypothesis, theory?) is that the social order is possible because we who live in 
(and as) it put it there, accountably, for anyone to see as being always-already 
there. That is, we do stuff in such a way that it can be seen and heard to be the 
stuff it is and not something else. I have always admired and often quoted Wes 
Sharrock’s (1995:4) concise way of putting it; so I won’t hesitate to do so again: 
Social order is easy to find because it’s put there to be found. When you go about 
your actions ... you do them so that (or in ways that) other people can see what 
you’re doing. You do your actions to have them recognized as the actions that 
they are. When you stand at the bus stop, you stand in such a way that you can be 
seen to be waiting for a bus. People across the street can see what you’re doing, 
according to where and how you’re standing.... [Y]ou’re standing at a bus stop 
and somebody comes and stands next to you and they stand in such a way that 
eventually you can see that these people are standing in a line and that one 
person’s the first and another is the second, and some person’s at the end. People 
stand around at bus stops in ways they can be seen to be waiting for a bus. 
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Notice here that not a word has necessarily been spoken; yet any occasion of 
doing such an ordinary thing as waiting for a bus can be preserved, analysed and 
re-analysed by others to search out its (as we might say) social-order-accountable 
properties. 
  This socially deep yet overtly displayed order of things may be found 
anywhere and everywhere. For example, it may be found in such diverse locales 
as therapy sessions, as Leudar et al show in their paper in this issue; interviews 
about infertility in Malawi (Bregje de Kok’s paper); TV studios (Broth) or 
emergency reports (Cromdal et al). It may even be found in such supposedly 
‘macro’ sociological settings as parliamentary debates (Dupret and Ferrié) ... and 
the list could go on but it must, inevitably, end somewhere for the practical 
purposes of a single issue. 
So, at the end of the day, there is Dennis Day who, to my mind at least, proposes a 
still-controversial solution to the question of how to analyse day-to-day events 
and their contexts — may the controversy continue and benefit all in the best of 
scientific spirits. But it’s not far from the point when he takes on the question of 
whether context for the analyst — whatever any given analyst takes that to be — 
should or should not have ‘demonstrable relevance to participants’; and then 
whether it’s OK to permit inclusion of materials from other recordings involving 
just those participants in just those settings. What if, as per Dennis’s large 
fieldwork corpus, the question of ethnicity crops up time and time again? 
  Our current issue, then, does predominantly feature conversational 
materials and contributes to CA in this sense. For all that, I don’t think, to adapt 
Stephen Hester and David Francis’s (2001:217) insightful expression, anyone here 
is at risk of losing their ethnomethodological moorings. 
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